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1 Introduction
Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than to the lack of information.
It is natural to presume that asymmetric unawareness may lead to speculative trade.
Indeed, in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we present a simple example of speculation
under unawareness in which there is common certainty of willingness to trade but agents
have a strict preference to trade despite the existence of a common prior.1 This is
impossible in standard state-space structures with a common prior. In standard “No
Trade” theorems, if there is common certainty of willingness to trade, then agents are
necessarily indifferent to trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Somewhat surprising, in
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we also prove a “No-trade” result according to which
under a common prior there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade.
This means that arbitrary small transaction costs rule out speculation under asymmetric
unawareness. The “No-trade” result in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) has been
stated for finite unawareness belief structures. In this note we generalize the result to
infinite unawareness belief structures. Such a generalization is relevant since the space of
underlying uncertainties may be large. Especially if it is large, agents may be unaware
of some of them. Moreover, the generalization serves as a robustness check for our “No-
trade” result for finite unawareness belief structures. It shows that the result in Heifetz,
Meier, and Schipper (2009) is not an artefact of the finiteness assumption but holds more
generally.
Recently we learned that Board and Chung (2009) present a different model of un-
awareness in which they also study speculative trade under what they term living in
“denial” and “paranoia”. They consider only finite spaces. The precise connection be-
tween our result and their result is yet to be explored.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces topological unaware-
ness belief structures. The general “No-trade” theorem is stated in Section 3. Finally,
Section 4 contains the proof of the theorem.
1The example in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) is a probabilistic version of the speculation
example in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006). Unawareness belief structures allow us to state the
common prior assumption.
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2 Topological Unawareness Belief Structures
We consider an unawareness belief structure as defined in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper
(2009) but with additional topological properties.
2.1 Compact Hausdorff State-Spaces
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order 
on S. If Sα and Sβ are such that Sα  Sβ we say that “Sα is more expressive than Sβ
– states of Sα describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of Sβ ”.
2 (S,)
is well-founded, that is, every non-empty subset X ⊆ S contains a -minimal element.
(That is, there is a S ′ ∈ X such that for all S ∈ X : if S  S ′, then S = S ′.) Each state-
space S ∈ S is a non-empty compact Hausdorff space with a Borel σ-field FS. Denote by
Ω =
⋃
α∈A Sα the union of these spaces. Ω is endowed with the disjoint-union topology:
O ⊆ Ω is open if and only if O ∩ S is open in S for all S ∈ S.
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less “rich” in terms of facts that may or may not
obtain in them. The partial order relates to the “richness” of spaces. The upmost space
of the lattice may be interpreted as the “objective” state-space. Its states encompass full
descriptions.
2.2 Continuous Projections
For every S and S ′ such that S ′  S, there is a continuous surjective projection rS′S :
S ′ → S, where rSS is the identity. (“rS′S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the
more limited vocabulary of S.”) Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal
to the cardinality of S ′. We require the projections to commute: If S ′′  S ′  S then
rS
′′
S = r
S′
S ◦ rS′′S′ . If ω ∈ S ′, denote ωS = rS′S (ω). If D ⊆ S ′, denote DS = {ωS : ω ∈ D}.
Projections “translate” states in “more expressive” spaces to states in “less expres-
sive” spaces by “erasing” facts that can not be expressed in a lower space.
2Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we
emphasize that these interpretations are not part of the definition of the set-theoretic structure.
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2.3 Events
Denote g(S) = {S ′ : S ′  S}. For D ⊆ S, denote D↑ = ⋃S′∈g(S) (rS′S )−1 (D). (“All the
extensions of descriptions in D to at least as expressive vocabularies.”)
An event is a pair (E, S), where E = D↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called
the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is uniquely
determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅S
for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Ω is an event.
Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also “express-
ible” in “more expressive” spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular
subset but also its inverse images in “more expressive” spaces.
Let Σ be the set of measurable events of Ω, i.e., D↑ such that D ∈ FS, for some
state-space S ∈ S. Note that unless S is a singleton, Σ is not an algebra because it
contains distinct ∅S for all S ∈ S.
2.4 Negation
If (D↑, S) is an event where D ⊆ S, the negation ¬(D↑, S) of (D↑, S) is defined by
¬(D↑, S) := ((S \D)↑, S). Note, that by this definition, the negation of a (measurable)
event is a (measurable) event. Abusing notation, we write ¬D↑ := (S \D)↑. Note that by
our notational convention, we have ¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. The
event ∅S should be interpreted as a “logical contradiction phrased with the expressive
power available in S.” ¬D↑ is typically a proper subset of the complement Ω \D↑ . That
is, (S \D)↑ $ Ω \D↑ .
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D↑ is both
expressible and valid – these are the states in D↑; there may be states in which its
description is expressible but invalid – these are the states in ¬D↑; and there may be
states in which neither its description nor its negation are expressible – these are the
states in
Ω \ (D↑ ∪ ¬D↑) = Ω \ S (D↑)↑ .
2.5 Conjunction and Disjunction
If
{(
D↑λ, Sλ
)}
λ∈L
is a finite or countable collection of events (with Dλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L),
their conjunction
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
is defined by
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
:=
((⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
, supλ∈L Sλ
)
.
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Note, that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then
we have
(⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
=
(⋂
λ∈L
((
rSSλ
)−1
(Dλ)
))↑
. Again, abusing notation, we write∧
λ∈LD
↑
λ :=
⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersec-
tion symbol ∩ interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ′) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if
and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S ′  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if S ′  S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) as long as we keep
in mind that in the case of E = ∅S we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F ). It follows
from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only
when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ).
The disjunction of
{
D↑λ
}
λ∈L
is defined by the de Morgan law
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ = ¬
(∧
λ∈L ¬
(
D↑λ
))
.
Typically
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ $
⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ, and if all Dλ are nonempty we have that
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ =⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ holds if and only if all the D
↑
λ have the same base-space. Note, that by these
definitions, the conjunction and disjunction of (at most countably many measurable)
events is a (measurable) event.
Apart from the topological conditions, the event-structure outlined so far is analogous
to Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009).
2.6 Regular Borel Probability Measures
Here and in what follows, the term ’events’ always means measurable events in Σ unless
otherwise stated.
For each S ∈ S, ∆ (S) is the set of regular Borel probability measures on (S,FS).
We consider this set itself as a measurable space which is endowed with the topology of
weak convergence.3
3This topology is generated by the sub-basis of sets of the form
{µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(O) > r}
where O ⊆ S is open and r ∈ R (see e.g. Billingsley (1968), appendix III). When S is Normal (and
in particular compact and/or metric), this topology coincides with the weak∗ topology - the weakest
topology for which the mapping
µ −→
∫
S
fdµ
is continuous for every continuous real-valued function f on S.
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⋃
S∈S ∆(S) is endowed with the disjoint-union topology: O∆ ⊆
⋃
S∈S ∆(S) is open if
and only if O∆ ∩∆(S) is open in ∆(S) for all S ∈ S.
Note that although each S and each ∆(S) are compact, if S is infinite, Ω and⋃
S∈S ∆(S) are not compact.
2.7 Marginals
For a probability measure µ ∈ ∆ (S ′), the marginal µ|S of µ on S  S ′ is defined by
µ|S (D) := µ
((
rS
′
S
)−1
(D)
)
, D ∈ FS.
Let Sµ be the space on which µ is a probability measure. Whenever Sµ  S(E) then
we abuse notation slightly and write
µ (E) = µ (E ∩ Sµ) .
If S(E)  Sµ, then we say that µ(E) is undefined.
2.8 Continuous Type Mappings
Let I be a nonempty finite or countable set of individuals. For every individual, each
state gives rise to a probabilistic belief over states in some space.
Definition 1 For each individual i ∈ I there is a continuous type mapping ti : Ω →⋃
α∈A∆ (Sα).
We require the type mapping ti to satisfy the following properties:
(0) Confinement: If ω ∈ S ′ then ti(ω) ∈ 4 (S) for some S  S ′.
(1) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S) then ti(ωS′) = ti(ω).
(2) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ω) ∈ 4(S ′) then ti(ωS) = ti(ω)|S.
(3) If S ′′  S ′  S, ω ∈ S ′′, and ti(ωS′) ∈ 4(S) then Sti(ω)  S.
ti(ω) represents individual i’s belief at state ω. Properties (0) to (3) guarantee the
consistent fit of beliefs and awareness at different state-spaces. Confinement means that
at any given state ω ∈ Ω an individual’s belief is concentrated on states that are all
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described with the same “vocabulary” - the “vocabulary” available to the individual at
ω. This “vocabulary” may be less expressive than the “vocabulary” used to describe
statements in the state ω.”
Properties (1) to (3) compare the types of an individual in a state ω and its projection
to ωS. Property (1) and (2) mean that at the projected state ωS the individual believes
everything she believes at ω given that she is aware of it at ωS. Property (3) means that
at ω an individual can not be unaware of an event that she is aware of at the projected
state ωS.
Define4
Beni (ω) :=
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′)|Sti(ω) = ti(ω)
}
.
This is the set of states at which individual i’s type or the marginal thereof coincides
with her type at ω. Such sets are events in our structure:
Remark 1 For any ω ∈ Ω, Beni(ω) is an Sti(ω)-based event, which is not necessarily
measurable.5
Assumption 1 If Beni(ω) ⊆ E, for an event E, then ti(ω)(E) = 1.
This assumption implies introspection (Property (va) in Proposition 9 in Heifetz,
Meier, and Schipper, 2009). Note, that if Beni(ω) is measurable, then Assumption 1
implies ti(ω)(Beni(ω)) = 1.
Definition 2 We denote by Ω :=
〈
S,
(
rSαSβ
)
SβSα
, (ti)i∈I
〉
an topological unawareness
belief structure.
Topological unawareness belief structures are analogous to unawareness belief struc-
tures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) except for the additional topological prop-
erties.
3 A Generalized “No-Trade” Theorem
Definition 3 (Prior) A prior for player i is a system of probability measures Pi =(
P Si
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) such that
4The name “Ben” is chosen analogously to the “ken” in knowledge structures.
5Even in a standard type-space, if the σ-algebra is not countably generated, then the set of states
where a player is of a certain type might not be measurable.
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1. The system is projective: If S ′  S then the marginal of P Si on S ′ is P S′i . (That
is, if E ∈ Σ is an event whose base-space S (E) is lower or equal to S ′, then
P Si (E) = P
S′
i (E).)
2. Each probability measure P Si is a convex combination of i’s beliefs in S: For every
event E ∈ Σ such that S(E)  S,
P Si (E ∩ S ∩ Ai (E)) =
∫
S∩Ai(E)
ti (·) (E) dP Si (·) . (1)
We call any probability measure µi ∈ ∆(S) satisfying equation (1) in place of P Si a
prior of player i on S.
Definition 4 (Common Prior) P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) (resp. P
S ∈ ∆ (S)) is a
common prior (resp. a common prior on S) if P (resp. P S) is a prior (resp. a prior on
S) for every player i ∈ I.
Denote by [ti(ω)] := {ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′) = ti(ω)}.
Definition 5 A common prior P =
(
P S
)
S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) (resp. a common prior P
S
on S) is positive if and only if for all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω: If ti (ω) ∈ 4 (S ′), for some S ′,
then P S
(
([ti (ω)] ∩ S ′)↑ ∩ S
)
> 0 for all S  S ′.
Note that by Lemma 3 below, [ti(ω)] ∩ S ′ ∈ FS′ .
Recall Remark 8 in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) according to which if Sˆ is the
upmost state-space in the lattice S, and (P Si )S∈S ∈
∏
S∈S ∆(S) is a tuple of probability
measures, then (P Si )S∈S is a prior for player i if and only if P
Sˆ
i is a prior for player i on
Sˆ and P Si is the marginal of P
Sˆ
i for every S ∈ S.
Definition 6 Let x1 and x2 be real numbers and v a continuous random variable on Ω.
Define the sets E≤x11 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
St1(ω)
v (·) d (t1 (ω)) (·) ≤ x1
}
and
E≥x22 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
St2(ω)
v (·) d (t2 (ω)) (·) ≥ x2
}
. We say that at ω, conditional on his
information, player 1 (resp. player 2) believes that the expectation of v is weakly below
x1 (resp. weakly above x2) if and only if ω ∈ E≤x11 (resp. ω ∈ E≥x21 ).
Theorem 1 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure and P a positive common
prior. Then there is no state ω˜ ∈ Ω such that there are a continuous random variable
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v : Ω −→ R and x1, x2 ∈ R, x1 < x2, with the following property: at ω˜ it is common
certainty that conditional on her information, player 1 believes that the expectation of v is
weakly below x1 and, conditional on his information, player 2 believes that the expectation
of v is weakly above x2.
This general “No-trade” theorem implies our “No-trade” theorem for finite unaware-
ness belief structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2009).
In Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we show by example that the converse of the
“No-trade” theorem does not hold.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Preliminary Definitions and Results
For i ∈ I, p ∈ [0, 1] and an event E, the p -belief operator is defined by
Bpi (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω)(E) ≥ p},
if there is a state ω such that ti(ω)(E) ≥ p, and by
Bpi (E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise. The mutual p-belief operator on events is defined by
Bp(E) =
⋂
i∈I
Bpi (E).
The common certainty operator on events is defined by
CB1 (E) =
∞⋂
n=1
(
B1
)n
(E).
These are standard definitions (e.g. see Monderer and Samet, 1989) adapted to our
unawareness structures.
As in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we define for every i ∈ I the awareness
operator
Ai (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : ti (ω) ∈ ∆ (S) for some S  S (E)} ,
for every event E, if there is a state ω such that ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S  S(E), and by
Ai(E) := ∅S(E)
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otherwise.
In Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 1 and 2) we show that Ai(E),
Bpi (E), B
p(E), and CB1(E) are all S(E)-based events. We also show in Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2009, Proposition 9) that standard properties of belief obtain. Moreover,
in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 3) we show “standard” properties
of awareness. One of those properties is weak necessitation, i.e., for any event E ∈ Σ,
Ai(E) = B
1
i (S(E)
↑). This property will be used later in the proof.
Definition 7 An event E is evident if for each i ∈ I, E ⊆ B1i (E).
Proposition 1 For every event F ∈ Σ:
(i) CB1(F ) is evident, that is CB1(F ) ⊆ B1i (CB1(F )) for all i ∈ I.
(ii) There exists an evident event E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ B1i (F ) for all i ∈ I, if
and only if ω ∈ CB1(F ).
The proof is analogous to Proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989) for a standard
state-space and thus omitted.
We define G ⊆ Ω to be a measurable set if and only if for all S ∈ S, G∩S ∈ FS. The
collection of measurable sets forms a sigma-algebra on Ω.
Let Ω be an unawareness belief structure. As in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009,
Section 2.13), we define the flattened type-space associated with the unawareness belief
structure Ω by
F (Ω) := 〈Ω,F , (tFi )i∈I〉,
where Ω is the union of all state-spaces in the unawareness belief structure Ω, F is the
collection of all measurable sets in Ω, and tFi : Ω −→ ∆(Ω,F) is defined by
tFi (ω)(E) :=
{
ti(ω)(E ∩ Sti(ω)) if E ∩ Sti(ω) 6= ∅
0 otherwise
The definition of the belief operator as well as standard properties of belief and
Proposition 1 can be extended to measurable subsets of Ω. The proofs are analogous and
thus omitted.
Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure and P a positive common prior.
For the proof of the theorem, we have to show that there is no evident measurable set
E ∈ F such that ω˜ ∈ E and∫
Ω
v(·)d(t1(ω))(·) ≤ x1 < x2 ≤
∫
Ω
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·)
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for all ω ∈ E.
We need the following lemmata:
Lemma 1 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure, v : Ω −→ R be a contin-
uous random variable, and x ∈ R. Then {ω ∈ Ω : ∫
Ω
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·) ≥ x
}
and{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
Ω
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·) ≤ x
}
are closed subsets of Ω.6
Proof of the Lemma. Since for every S ∈ S, the topology on ∆(S) coincides with
the weak∗ topology and since in particular, v : S −→ R is continuous,{
µ ∈ ∆(S) : ∫
S
v(·)dµ(·) < x} is open in ∆(S). Hence {ν ∈ ⋃S∈S ∆(S) : ∫S v(·)dν(·) < x}
is open in
⋃
S∈S ∆(S).
By the continuity of ti : Ω −→
⋃
S∈S ∆(S), it follows that{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
Ω
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·) < x
}
is open in Ω and hence it’s relative complement with
respect to Ω,
{
ω ∈ Ω : ∫
Ω
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·) ≥ x
}
is closed in Ω. 
Lemma 2 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Let E be a closed subset
of Ω. Then CB1(E) is a closed subset of Ω.
Proof of the Lemma. The relative complement of E with respect of Ω, Ω \ E, is
open, and hence for every S ∈ S, (Ω \E)∩S = S \ (E ∩S) is open in S. Therefore {µ ∈
∆(S) : µ(S\(E∩S)) > 0} is open. It follows that ⋃S∈S {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(S \ (E ∩ S)) > 0}
is open. Hence for every i ∈ I, {ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω) ∈ ⋃S∈S {µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(S \ (E ∩ S)) > 0}}
is open. It follows that it’s relative complement with respect to Ω,
B1i (E) =
{
ω ∈ Ω : ti(ω) ∈
⋃
S∈S{µ ∈ ∆(S) : µ(E ∩ S) = 1}
}
is closed. Since an arbitrary
intersection of closed sets is closed, the Lemma follows by induction. 
Lemma 3 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Then for every ω ∈ Ω,
every state-space S ∈ S and every player i ∈ I, the set {ω′ ∈ Ω : ti(ω′) = ti(ω)} ∩ S is
closed in S.
Proof of the Lemma. Since ∆(Sti(ω)) is the set of regular Borel probability measures
on Sti(ω) endowed with the topology of weak convergence, {ti(ω)} is closed in ∆(Sti(ω)),
and hence {ti(ω)} is closed in
⋃
S∈S ∆(S). Therefore, by continuity of ti, t
−1
i ({ti(ω)}) =
[ti(ω)] is closed in Ω. Hence, [ti(ω)] ∩ S is closed in S. 
6Note that we abuse notation and write
∫
Ω
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·) instead of
∫
Sti(ω)
v(·)d(ti(ω))(·).
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Lemma 4 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Let P S be a positive
(common) prior on the state-space S, and let ω ∈ S such that ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S). Then, for
every E ∈ FS, we do have ti(ω)(E) = ti(ω)(E ∩ [ti(ω)]) = PS(E∩[ti(ω)])PS(S∩[ti(ω)]) .
Proof. We have ti(ω)(S ∩ [ti(ω)]) = 1 and hence ti(ω)(E) = ti(ω)(E ∩ S ∩ [ti(ω)]) =
ti(ω)(E ∩ [ti(ω)]). Since P S is positive, we do have P S(S ∩ [ti(ω)]) > 0.
Since S((E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑) = S and since ω′ ∈ [ti(ω)] implies ti(ω′) ∈ ∆(S), we do have
(E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑∩Ai((E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑) = (E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑. We also have (S ∩ [ti(ω)])↑ ⊆ Ai(S↑) =
Ai((E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑). The last equality follows from weak necessitation. We have - by the
definition of a common prior - the following (with our abuse of notation):
P S(E ∩ [ti(ω)]) =
∫
S∩Ai((E∩[ti(ω)])↑)
ti(·)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])dP S(·)
=
∫
S∩[ti(ω)]
ti(·)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])dP S(·)
+
∫
(S∩Ai(S↑))\(S∩[ti(ω)])
ti(·)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])dP S(·)
But if ω′ ∈ (S ∩Ai((E ∩ [ti(ω)])↑)) \ (S ∩ [ti(ω)]), then ti(ω′)(E ∩ [ti(ω)]) = 0, and hence,
we have
P S(E ∩ [ti(ω)]) =
∫
S∩[ti(ω)]
ti(·)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])dP S(·)
= ti(ω)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])
∫
S∩[ti(ω)]
1dP S(·)
= ti(ω)(E ∩ [ti(ω)])P S(S ∩ [ti(ω)]).
Since P S(S ∩ [ti(ω)]) > 0, it follows that ti(ω)(E ∩ [ti(ω)]) = PS(E∩[ti(ω)])PS(S∩[ti(ω)]) . 
4.2 Proof of the Theorem
Suppose by contradiction, that there are x1, x2 ∈ R with x1 < x2 and a continuous
random variable v : Ω −→ R such that CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 ) 6= ∅, where
E≤x11 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
St1(ω)
v(·)d(t1(ω))(·) ≤ x1
}
, and
E≥x22 :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
St2(ω)
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·) ≥ x2
}
.
Let S be a -minimal state-space with the property that S ∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 ) 6= ∅.
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By standard properties of beliefs, we have CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 ) ⊆ B1i (CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 ))
for i = 1, 2. This implies that for each ω ∈ S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 ) and i = 1, 2, we have
ti(ω)(CB
1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )) = 1, which by the minimality of S implies that ti(ω) ∈ ∆(S)
and ti(ω)(S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )) = 1.
By Lemma 2, S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )) is closed in S. Therefore it is easy to verify
that if flattened, F (S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )), that is S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 ) with the
induced structure, is a standard topological type-space (as in Heifetz, 2006), since for
each ω ∈ S ∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 ), we have ti(ω)(S ∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )) = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Since P S is a positive prior on S, we have that P S(S ∩ [ti(ω)]) > 0, for each ω ∈ S.
For ω ∈ S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 ) we also have ti(ω)(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )∩ [ti(ω)]) = 1,
and by Lemma 4, we have ti(ω)(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )∩[ti(ω)]) = P
S(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )∩[ti(ω)])
PS(S∩[ti(ω)]) .
Hence, since P S(S∩ [ti(ω)]) > 0, it follows that P S(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )∩ [ti(ω)]) =
P S(S ∩ [ti(ω)]) > 0. It follows that P S(S ∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )) > 0. Therefore it is easy
to check that P
S(·)
PS(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 ))
is a common prior on F (S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )).
Claim: Let ω ∈ CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )∩S. Then
∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)d(t1(ω))(·) ≤ x1
and
∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·) ≥ x2.
We prove the second inequality, the first is analogous to the second one. We know
already that t2(ω) ∈ ∆(S). By the definitions ω ∈ S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 ) implies ω ∈
S∩B12(E≥x22 ), and therefore t2(ω)([t2(ω)]∩E≥x22 ∩S) = 1. It follows that [t2(ω)]∩E≥x22 ∩S
is non-empty. Let ω′ ∈ [t2(ω)] ∩ E≥x22 ∩ S. Then we have
∫
S
v(·)d(t2(ω′))(·) ≥ x2. But
we have t2(ω) = t2(ω
′) and therefore
∫
S
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·) ≥ x2.
Since S is compact and v : S −→ R is continuous, there is a v¯ ∈ R such that |v(ω˜)| ≤ v¯
for all ω˜ ∈ S.
Since t2(ω)(S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )) = 1, we have∣∣∣∣∣
∫
S\(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 ))
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ v¯
∫
S\(S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 ))
1d(t2(ω))(·)
= v¯ t2(ω)(S \ (S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 )))
= 0.
Hence, we have∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·) =
∫
S
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·) ≥ x2
and this finishes the proof of the claim.
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It follows that we have found a standard topological type-space S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E≥x22 )
in the sense of Heifetz (2006) with a common prior and a continuous random variable
v : S ∩ CB1(E≤x11 ∩ E≥x22 ) −→ R such that∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)d(t1(ω))(·) ≤ x1 < x2 ≤
∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)d(t2(ω))(·).
Note that if we replace v(·) by v(·)− x1+x2
2
, we get∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)− x1 + x2
2
d(t1(ω))(·) < 0 <
∫
S∩CB1(E≤x11 ∩E
≥x2
2 )
v(·)− x1 + x2
2
d(t2(ω))(·).
But this is a contradiction to Feinberg’s (2000) Theorem (Proposition 1 in Heifetz, 2006).
Hence this completes the proof of the theorem. 
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